I provide an overview of the differences between psychological pessimism and philosophical pessimism. Based on a historic reading of the original 19th century German pessimist philosophers I provide a definition of what I call "transcendental pessimism" and sketch some of the reasons why it is different from other pessimist perspectives such as anti-natalism.

Just after my return from a symposium at the University of Navarre on the dialogue between faith and culture in Christian antiquity, I had the opportunity to read Peroli's book. His approach is strikingly in accord with many of the claims made at Navarre. The overall approach of his study may be summed up with the following words: early Christian thought effected an authentic inculturation, [[sic]] not just by expressing the faith in the dominant philosophical categories of the time, but (...) by transforming those very categories in order to rationally express Christian belief. This is precisely the core achievement of the philosophical anthropology of Gregory of Nissa. St. Gregory actively fed upon neo-Platonism. He made use of Platonic/neo-platonic thought in order to demonstrate the rationality of Christian faith, even in those areas of reflection where the faith might seem most distant from the reigning philosophical tenets. (shrink)

I argue that according to Kristie Dotson, non-epistemic motives such as social, ethical and material harm can motivate a speaker to smother her testimony. I present this exegesis of Dotson's view of testimonial smothering in response to J. L. Lee's and Trystan Goetze's reply to my commentary of Lee's view that anticipatory epistemic injustice is distinct from testimonial smothering.

When a computer system causes harm, who is responsible? This question has renewed significance given the proliferation of autonomous systems enabled by modern artificial intelligence techniques. At the root of this problem is a philosophical difficulty known in the literature as the responsibility gap. That is to say, because of the causal distance between the designers of autonomous systems and the eventual outcomes of those systems, the dilution of agency within the large and complex teams that design autonomous systems, and (...) the impossibility of fully predicting how autonomous systems will behave once deployed, determining who is morally responsible for harms caused by autonomous systems is unclear at a conceptual level. I review past work on this topic, criticizing prior works for suggesting workarounds rather than philosophical answers to the conceptual problem presented by the responsibility gap. The view I develop, drawing on my earlier work on vicarious moral responsibility, explains why computing professionals are ethically required to take responsibility for the systems they design, despite not being blameworthy for the harms these systems may cause. (shrink)

When we encounter extremist rhetoric, we often find it dumbfounding, incredible, or straightforwardly unintelligible. For this reason, it can be tempting to dismiss or ignore it, at least where it is safe to do so. The problem discussed in this paper is that such dismissals may be, at least in certain circumstances, epistemically unjust. Specifically, it appears that recent work on the phenomenon of hermeneutical injustice compels us to accept two unpalatable conclusions: first, that this failure of intelligibility when we (...) encounter extremist rhetoric may be a manifestation of a hermeneutical injustice; and second, that remedying this injustice requires that we ought to become more engaged with and receptive of extremist worldviews. Whilst some theorists might interpret this as a reductio of this framework of epistemic in/justice, we push back against this conclusion. First, we argue that with a suitably amended conception of hermeneutical justice—one that is sensitive to the contextual nature of our hermeneutical responsibilities, and to the difference between understanding a worldview and accepting it—we can bite the bullet and accept that certain extremists are subject to hermeneutical injustice, but without committing ourselves to any unpalatable conclusions about how we ought to remedy these injustices. Second, we argue that bringing the framework of hermeneutical in/justice to bear upon the experience of certain extremists actually provides a new and useful perspective on one of the causes of extremism, and how it might be undermined. (shrink)

While calls to integrate ethics into computer science education go back decades, recent high-profile ethical failures related to computing technology by large technology companies, governments, and academic institutions have accelerated the adoption of computer ethics education at all levels of instruction. Discussions of how to integrate ethics into existing computer science programmes often focus on the structure of the intervention—embedded modules or dedicated courses, humanists or computer scientists as ethics instructors—or on the specific content to be included—lists of case studies (...) and essential topics to cover. While proponents of computer ethics education often emphasize the importance of closely connecting ethical and technical content in these initiatives, most do not reflect in depth on the variety of ways in which the disciplines can be combined. In this paper, I deploy a framework from cross- disciplinary studies that categorizes academic projects that work across disciplines as multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, or transdisciplinary, depending on the degree of integration. When applied to computer ethics education, this framework is orthogonal to the structure and content of the initiative, as I illustrate using examples of dedicated ethics courses and embedded modules. It therefore highlights additional features of cross-disciplinary teaching that need to be considered when planning a computer ethics programme. I argue that computer ethics education should aim to be at least interdisciplinary—multidisciplinary initiatives are less aligned with the pedagogical aims of computer ethics—and that computer ethics educators should experiment with fully transdisciplinary education that could transform computer science as a whole for the better. (shrink)

When you expect something bad to happen, you take action to avoid it. That is the principle of action that underlies J. Y. Lee’s recent paper (2021), which presents a new form of epistemic injustice that arises from anticipating negative consequences for testifying. In this brief reply article occasioned by Lee’s essay, I make two main contributions to the discussion of this idea. The first (§§2–3) is an intervention in the discussion between Lee and Eric Bayruns García regarding the relationship (...) between anticipatory epistemic injustice and Kristie Dotson’s concept of testimonial smothering. The second (§§4–5) is to expand the concept of anticipatory epistemic injustice into the educational context, and to illuminate yet another form of anticipatory epistemic injustice, which I call anticipatory zetetic injustice (§6). (shrink)

Since the launch of applications such as DALL-E, Midjourney, and Stable Diffusion, generative artificial intelligence has been controversial as a tool for creating artwork. While some have presented longtermist worries about these technologies as harbingers of fully automated futures to come, more pressing is the impact of generative AI on creative labour in the present. Already, business leaders have begun replacing human artistic labour with AI-generated images. In response, the artistic community has launched a protest movement, which argues that AI (...) image generation is a kind of theft. This paper analyzes, substantiates, and critiques these arguments, concluding that AI image generators involve an unethical kind of labour theft. If correct, many other AI applications also rely upon theft. (shrink)

In this chapter, I argue that it is impossible to trust the Big Tech companies, in an ethically important sense of trust. The argument is not that these companies are untrustworthy. Rather, I argue that the power to hold the trustee accountable is a necessary component of this sense of trust, and, because these companies are so powerful, they are immune to our attempts, as individuals or nation-states, to hold them to account. It is, therefore, literally impossible to trust Big (...) Tech. After introducing the accounts of trust and power that I deploy, I argue that Big Tech companies have four kinds of power that render them unaccountable: fiscal power, political power, data power, and cognitive power. I conclude by reflecting on recent calls to break up the Big Tech firms, suggesting a new antitrust test in the light of my arguments. (shrink)

This thesis concerns our moral and epistemic responsibilities regarding our concepts. I argue that certain concepts can be morally, epistemically, or socially problematic. This is particularly concerning with regard to our concepts of social kinds, which may have both descriptive and evaluative aspects. Being ignorant of certain concepts, or possessing mistaken conceptions, can be problematic for similar reasons, and contributes to various forms of epistemic injustice. I defend an expanded view of a type of epistemic injustice known as ‘hermeneutical injustice’, (...) where widespread conceptual ignorance puts members of marginalized groups at risk of their distinctive and important experiences lacking intelligible interpretations. Together, I call the use of problematic concepts or the ignorance of appropriate concepts ‘conceptual incapacities’. I discuss the conditions under which we may be responsible for our conceptual incapacities on several major theories of responsibility, developing my own account of responsibility in the process, according to which we are responsible for something just in case it was caused by one of our reasons-responsive constitutive psychological traits. However, I argue that regardless of whether we are responsible for something, we may still be required to take responsibility for it. Whether or not we are responsible for our conceptual incapacities, we are required to reflect critically upon them in a variety of scenarios that throw our use of those concepts into question. I consider the method of conceptual engineering — the philosophical critique and revision of concepts — as one way we might take responsibility for our concepts, or at least, defer that duty to experts. But, this top-down model of conceptual revision is insufficient. Using a pragmatist model of the social epistemology of morality, I argue that conceptual inquiry is a social endeavour in which we are all required to participate, to some degree. (shrink)

How do we prepare engineering students to make ethical and responsible decisions in their professional work? This paper presents an approach that enhances engineering students’ engagement with ethical reasoning by simulating decision-making in a complex scenario. The approach has two principal inspirations. The first is Anthony Weston’s scenario-based teaching. Weston’s concept of a scenario is a situation that changes in response to choices made by participants, according to an inner logic. Scenarios can dynamically explore open-ended complex problems without imposing predetermined (...) results, allowing students to apply their ethical reasoning in a more realistic fashion. The second inspiration is Thi Nguyen’s theory of games. According to Nguyen, games are the “art of agency,” meaning that they provide a structure under which some result is agreed to be valuable, along with prescribed ways of achieving that result, in a relatively low-stakes and temporary social arrangement. By playing many games, Nguyen argues, we can develop a “library of agency,” that is to say, a set of values and means to achieving them that can inform how we make high-stakes decisions in real life. Engaging with carefully designed game scenarios, then, can enable students to practice making ethical decisions within a structured framework, which unfolds in response to their choices, while their decisions are driven by some defined goal. This roleplaying game–based approach thus allows students to build their own ethical libraries of agency, in preparation for professional decision-making. The approach is illustrated using a specific example recently deployed in a seminar on engineered living materials (building materials that incorporate living tissues). The scenario uses techniques from tabletop roleplaying games (e.g. Dungeons & Dragons) for outcome resolution, adventure design, and character creation. Through the game, students practice making difficult decisions in a humanitarian context. (shrink)

The use of language models in Web applications and other areas of computing and business have grown significantly over the last five years. One reason for this growth is the improvement in performance of language models on a number of benchmarks — but a side effect of these advances has been the adoption of a “bigger is always better” paradigm when it comes to the size of training, testing, and challenge datasets. Drawing on previous criticisms of this paradigm as applied (...) to large training datasets crawled from pre-existing text on the Web, we extend the critique to challenge datasets custom-created by crowdworkers. We present several sets of criticisms, where ethical and scientific issues in language model research reinforce each other: labour injustices in crowdwork, dataset quality and inscrutability, inequities in the research community, and centralized corporate control of the technology. We also present a new type of tool for researchers to use in examining large datasets when evaluating them for quality. (shrink)

According to Miranda Fricker, a hermeneutical injustice occurs when there is a deficit in our shared tools of social interpretation, such that marginalized social groups are at a disadvantage in making sense of their distinctive and important experiences. Critics have claimed that Fricker's account ignores or precludes a phenomenon I call hermeneutical dissent, where marginalized groups have produced their own interpretive tools for making sense of those experiences. I clarify the nature of hermeneutical injustice to make room for hermeneutical dissent, (...) clearing up the structure of the collective hermeneutical resource and the fundamental harm of hermeneutical injustice. I then provide a more nuanced account of the hermeneutical resources in play in instances of hermeneutical injustice, enabling six species of the injustice to be distinguished. Finally, I reflect on the corrective virtue of hermeneutical justice in light of hermeneutical dissent. (shrink)

Attempts to solve the issue of divine action in nature have resulted in many innovative proposals seeking to explain how God can act within nature without disrupting the created order but introducing novelty in the history of the universe. My goal is to show how Aquinas' doctrine of providence, mainly as expressed in his De Potentia Dei, fulfils the criteria for an account of divine action: that God's action is providential in the sense that God is involved in the individual (...) and particular here and now. -/- . (shrink)

Goetz outlined legal models of identical entities that include natural persons who are identical to a coregency and natural persons who are identical to a general partnership. Those entities cohere with the formula logic of relative identity. This essay outlines the coexistence of relative identity and numerical identity in the models of identical legal entities, which is impure relative identity. These models support the synthesis of Relative Trinitarianism and Social Trinitarianism, which I call Relative-Social Trinitarianism.

En este breve comentario discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación de la epistemología de Davidson que sugiere Willian Duica en su reciente libro. Luego de una presentación somera del libro me centro en tres asuntos centrales de la interpretación de Duica. En primer lugar, argumento que su lectura de la crítica de Davidson al dualismo esquema/contenido es muy restrictiva y deja abierta la posibilidad de un realismo directo empirista. En segundo lugar, argumento que en su lectura el propio Duica se (...) compromete inadvertidamente con un empirismo de este tipo y, de este modo, su interpretación entra en tensión con el coherentismo de Davidson. Finalmente, discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación que hace Duica de la tesis davidsoniana de la triangulación. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is concerned with the improvement of our concepts. The motivating thought behind many such projects is that some of our concepts are defective. But, if to use a defective concept is to do something wrong, and if to do something wrong one must be in control of what one is doing, there might be no defective concepts, since we typically are not in control of our concept use. To address this problem, this paper turns from appraising the concepts (...) we use to appraising the people who use them. First, I outline several ways in which the use of a concept can violate moral standards. Second, I discuss three accounts of moral responsibility, which I call voluntarism, rationalism, and psychologism, arguing that each allows us to find at least some cases where we are responsible for using defective concepts. Third, I answer an objection that because most of our concepts are acquired through processes for which we are not responsible, our use of defective concepts is a matter of bad luck, and not something for which we are responsible after all. Finally, I conclude by discussing some of the ways we may hold people accountable for using defective concepts. (shrink)

This volume has its roots in two recent developments within mainstream analytic epistemology: a growing recognition over the past two or three decades of the active and social nature of our epistemic lives; and, more recently still, the increasing appreciation of the various ways in which the epistemic practices of individuals and societies can, and often do, go wrong. The theoretical analysis of these breakdowns in epistemic practice, along with the various harms and wrongs that follow as a consequence, constitutes (...) an approach to epistemology that we refer to as non-ideal epistemology. In this introductory chapter we introduce and contextualise the ten essays that comprise this volume, situating them within four broad sub-fields: vice epistemology, epistemic injustice, inter-personal epistemic practices, and applied epistemology. We also provide a brief overview of several other important growth areas in non-ideal epistemology. (shrink)

This essay proposes an ontological model in which a legal person such as a polity possesses natural unity from group properties that emerge in the self-organization of the human population. Also, analysis of customary legal persons and property indicates noncontradictory paradoxes that include Aristotelian essence of an entity, relative identity over time, ubiquitous authority, coinciding authorities, and identical entities. Mathematical modeling helps to explain the logic of the paradoxes.

In a recent remarkable article, Froese (2023) presents his Irruption Theory to explain how motivations can make a behavioral difference in motivated activity. In this opinion article, we review the main tenets of Froese’s theory, and highlight its difficulty in overcoming the randomness challenge it supposedly solves, that is, the issue of how adaptive behavior can arise in the face of material underdetermination. To advance our understanding of motivated behavior in line with Froese’s approach, we recommend that future work should (...) endorse a multilevel pluralistic approach to causation and explanation in which motivations could genuinely play an irreducible role. Additionally, in line with the life-mind continuity thesis, we suggest that the best place to look for the interplay between motivations and nonmotivational physical, biological, and dynamical factors, may be at the level of the continuous feeling of being an embodied, living organism. (shrink)

Contemporary debates on divine action tend to focus on finding a space in nature where there would be no natural causes, where nature offers indeterminacy, openness, and potentiality, to place God’s action. These places are found through the natural sciences, in particular quantum mechanics. God’s action is then located in those ontological ”causal-gaps’ offered by certain interpretations of quantum mechanics. In this view, God would determine what is left underdetermined in nature without disrupting the laws of nature. These contemporary proposals (...) evidence at least two unexamined assumptions, which frame the discussion in such a way that they portray God as acting as a secondary cause or a ”cause among causes’. God is somewhat required to act within these ”gaps’, binding God to the laws of nature, and placing God’s action at the level of secondary causes. I suggest that understanding God’s action, following Thomas Aquinas, in terms of primary and secondary causation could help dissolve this difficulty. Aquinas moves away from this objection by suggesting to speak of an analogical notion of cause, allowing for an analogical understanding of God’s causality in nature. With a radically different understanding of the interplay between secondary causes and God, Aquinas manages to avoid conceiving God as a cause among causes, keeping the distinctive transcendent character of God’s causality safe from objections. (shrink)

En este trabajo, nos proponemos redefinir las posturas que toman parte en el debate entre realismo y antirrealismo científicos, dejando de concebirlas únicamente como doctrinas o teorías que describen cómo es el mundo. En cambio, acorde al camino iniciado por van Fraassen en The empirical stance, optamos por definirlas como stances: políticas, estrategias o perspectivas a partir de las cuales construimos creencias fácticas. Así, en primera instancia nos dedicamos a entender qué es una stance y cómo caracterizar esta noción. En (...) segundo lugar, exploramos metodologías y enfoques para tratar el realismo y el antirrealismo como stances, y, en esta clave, definirlos adecuadamente. Por último, examinamos el impacto de esta propuesta en la explicación de los acuerdos y desacuerdos en el debate, evaluando los grados de afinidad o distancia en las perspectivas en juego. (shrink)

The general aim of this article is to give a critical interpretation of post-trial obligations towards individual research participants in the Declaration of Helsinki 2013. Transitioning research participants to the appropriate health care when a research study ends is a global problem. The publication of a new version of the Declaration of Helsinki is a great opportunity to discuss it. In my view, the Declaration of Helsinki 2013 identifies at least two clearly different types of post-trial obligations, specifically, access to (...) care after research and access to information after research. The agents entitled to receive post-trial access are the individual participants in research studies. The Declaration identifies the sponsors, researchers and host country governments as the main agents responsible for complying with the post-trial obligations mentioned above. To justify this interpretation of post-trial obligations, I first introduce a classification of post-trial obligations and illustrate its application with examples from post-trial ethics literature. I then make a brief reconstruction of the formulations of post-trial obligations of the Declaration of Helsinki from 2000 to 2008 to correlate the changes with some of the most salient ethical arguments. Finally I advance a critical interpretation of the latest formulation of post-trial obligations. I defend the view that paragraph 34 of ‘Post-trial provisions’ is an improved formulation by comparison with earlier versions, especially for identifying responsible agents and abandoning ambiguous ‘fair benefit’ language. However, I criticize the disappearance of ‘access to other appropriate care’ present in the Declaration since 2004 and the narrow scope given to obligations of access to information after research. (shrink)

The deep influence of affectivity on learning is now widely acknowledged (Keefer et al., 2018; Sánchez-Álvarez et al., 2021). For instance, it has been shown that affect influences key learning-relevant processes, such as motivation, perception, behavior, and critical thinking (Izard, 2002; Mayer & Salovey, 1997). Evidence also shows that emotion and mood strongly influence attention, which in turn drives learning and memory (Elbertson et al., 2010; Elias et al., 1997). Intersubjective phenomena, such as the degree of affection and respect between (...) child and teacher, also affect the child’s learning processes, academic outcomes, and brain development (Kusché & Greenberg, 2006; Ryan & Patrick, 2001). However, the relevant literature is not paying attention to increasing evidence showing that affective phenomena are rooted in interoceptive and homeostatic self- and co-regulatory processes within and between people’s living bodies (Barrett, 2017; Carvalho & Damasio, 2021; Craig, 2015, 2018; Fotopoulou et al., 2022; Fotopoulou & Tsakiris, 2017; Seth & Friston, 2016). In this theoretical chapter, we explore this connection and its importance for learning. We argue that affective experience plays a fundamental role in learning, and that affective experience is rooted in the homeostatic self-/co-regulation of living bodies. Therefore, the homeostatic self-/co-regulation of living bodies plays a fundamental role in learning. In other words, there is an intra- and interpersonal somatic dimension of learning that demands explicit consideration in educational contexts. In this way, we aim to contribute to an understanding of learning and education that moves away from an individualistic, brain-centered information-processing conception toward one centered on sentient, interdependent living bodies. (shrink)

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is currently one of the most influential scientific theories of consciousness. Here, we focus specifically on a metaphysical aspect of the theory’s most recent version (IIT 4.0), what we may call its idealistic ontology, and its tension with a kind of realism about the external world that IIT also endorses. IIT 4.0 openly rejects the mainstream view that consciousness is generated by the brain, positing instead that consciousness is ontologically primary while the physical domain is just (...) “operational”. However, this philosophical position is presently underdeveloped and is not rigorously formulated in IIT, potentially leading to many misinterpretations and undermining its overall explanatory power. In the present paper we aim to address this issue. We argue that IIT’s idealistic ontology should be understood as a specific combination of phenomenal primitivism, reductionism regarding Φ-structures and complexes, and eliminativism about non-conscious physical entities. Having clarified this, we then focus on the problematic tension between IIT’s idealistic ontology and its simultaneous endorsement of realism, according to which there is some kind of external reality independent of our minds. After refuting three potential solutions to this theoretical tension, we propose the most plausible alternative: understanding IIT’s realism as an assertion of the existence of other experiences beyond one’s own, what we call a non-solipsistic idealist realism. We end with concluding remarks and future research avenues. (shrink)

I welcome with great enthusiasm Meling and Scheidegger’s (2023; henceforth “M&S”) timely contribution to advance an enactive approach to psychedelic therapy, especially to the complex causality involved. Their two main research questions concerned:(i) the causal interaction between the psychedelic molecule and brain activity; and (ii) the causal interaction between brain activity and the psychedelic experience. While I largely agree with and celebrate much of what is proposed by M&S, especially their employment of key enactive concepts to advance our understanding of (...) the first research question, in the following, I will present some worries regarding their answers to the second. Although I agree that there is probably a two-way reciprocal relationship between neural activity and experience, I have several points of contention regarding M&S’s proposal. My hope is to stimulate discussion on M&S’s important contribution, and to help advance a much-needed enactive science of psychedelics. (shrink)

In a recent paper, John Fischer develops a new argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) based on a deterministic scenario. Fischer uses this result (i) to rebut the Dilemma Defense - a well-known incompatibilist response to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to PAP; and (ii) to maintain that: If causal determinism rules out moral responsibility, it is not just in virtue of eliminating alternative possibilities. In this article, we argue that Fischer's new argument against PAP fails, thus leaving points (i) and (...) (ii) unsupported. (shrink)

En este ensayo examino el conflicto aparente entre nuestro conocimiento de ciertas distinciones semánticas de nuestro lenguaje y la tesis de la indeterminación de la traducción de Ouine. Este examen nos permitirá entender la manera como se articula dicha tesis con otros sectores de su filosofía. En particular, argumento que la tesis de la indeterminación de la traducción, estrictamente hablando, cumple· una función legitimadora en el sistema quineano. Con ella Quine, más que obtener una nueva conclusión en el ámbito de (...) la semántica, logra validar sus compromisos previos con el fisicalismo extensionalista y el conductismo lingüístico. (shrink)

In consciousness studies there is a growing tendency to consider experience as (i) fundamentally affective and (ii) deeply interlinked with interoceptive and homeostatic bodily processes. However, this view still needs further development to be part of any rigorous theory of consciousness. To advance in this direction, we ask: (1) is there any affective type that is always present in consciousness?, (2) is it related to interoception and homeostasis?, and (3) what are its properties? Here we analyse and compare Jim Russell's (...) core affect and Thomas Fuchs' concept of vitality, and propose a more encompassing notion that subsumes both: continuous organismic sentience. It provides affirmative answers to questions 1 and 2, and, regarding question 3, a preliminary list of thirteen properties divided into ontological, phenomenological, and functional categories. This is the first of a series of studies that will systematically address different notions of a fundamental, homeostatically-rooted affective type, to achieve a rigorous, unified concept for consciousness science. (shrink)

A lo largo del último siglo, se ha intentado examinar la naturaleza de los estados mentales desde numerosas perspectivas, aunque ignorando con frecuencia que toda teoría de la mente también debe analizar adecuadamente las emociones. El propósito de este trabajo es explicitar los requisitos que debe cumplir una buena teoría acerca de lo emocional, a partir del examen crítico de tres enfoques distintos: el conductismo, el funcionalismo y el enactivismo. Argumentaré que, entre ellos, solo el último constituye una teoría satisfactoria (...) porque explicita el rol precio que cumple la dimensión corporal en nuestra experiencia emocional. (shrink)

En este ensayo exploro cierta veta reduccionista del enfoque enactivo de Noë. Primero argumento que su concepción de nuestro encuentro perceptual con las propiedades intrínsecas de los objetos requiere una metafísica relacional revisionista para ser exitosa. Luego argumento que la propuesta de Noë sobre el rol de la percepción para el pensamiento espacial exige una concepción revisionista de nuestros conceptos espaciales cotidianos. Finalmente, sugiero que a la base de estas formas de revisionismo está una comprensión reduccionista de la egocentricidad perceptual (...) que debe abandonarse si queremos una concepción más substantiva de la percepción y su rol explicativo en el pensamiento. (shrink)

En el año 2000 se publica la quinta revisión de la Declaración de Helsinki con el objetivo de responder a nuevos problemas éticos producidos en la última década por las investigaciones biomédicas realizadas en países en desarrollo. Una de las innovaciones más importantes que presenta la Declaración es la formulación del principio ético de acceso post investigación obligatorio para los participantes. En el presente trabajo, comienzo con la exposición del estado del consenso internacional sobre el carácter obligatorio del acceso post (...) investigación, de acuerdo con las guías y documentos de países desarrollados y en desarrollo. Luego, reconstruyo la justificación ética del principio de acceso post investigación y discuto algunos argumentos que se han presentado en su contra. De esta forma, defiendo la idea de que el acceso post investigación a las intervenciones probadas efectivas debe ser obligatorio siempre que los participantes se beneficien de las mismas y no tengan un acceso alternativo a ellas. (shrink)

Purpose A mixed-method study was performed to determine the impact of integrating systems thinking (ST) into an electronic learning module for junior high school teachers in the Philippines. The study aims to assess how an ST approach to pedagogy compared against a conventional approach in terms of contribution to the participants’ global climate change content knowledge, holistic thinking and depth and accuracy of knowledge and reasoning. -/- Design/methodology/approach The study implemented e-learning modules using an ST approach versus a conventional approach (...) in teaching climate science to junior high school teachers. The paper presents quantitative data obtained from pre and posttests results of the 20 teacher-participants and qualitative data obtained during the focus-group discussion (FGD) after the implementation of the study. -/- Findings The results from the statistical analysis indicated that the ST group obtained a significant increase in their assessment scores compared to the non-ST group, according to predetermined criteria. Content knowledge, depth and accuracy of knowledge and reasoning increased the most. The participants mentioned during the FGD that the module helped deepen their understanding of climate change. -/- Research limitations/implications The study was limited to 20 teacher-participants, but it has relevance for public school teachers in the country given that participants had raised concerns regarding the lack of training in their schools for teaching climate science. They admitted that they lacked critical information to include in climate change topics in their classes. -/- Originality/value This paper shows how the ST approach can be used to teach climate change to junior high students. The e-learning module can provide teachers with better understanding, knowledge and reasoning to teach climate change to high school students more effectively. (shrink)

This paper models God and time in the framework of modern physics. God bridges and simultaneously exists in (1) a universe with infinite tenseless time and (2) a created parallel universe with tensed time and a point origin. The primary attributes of God are inexhaustible love, inexhaustible perception, and inexhaustible force. The model also incorporates modern physics theories that include relativity, the conservation of energy, quantum mechanics, and multiverse geometry. For example, creation out of nothing and divine intervention are subject (...) to physical processes and likewise nomological possibility. I will call this model semiclassical theism. (shrink)

This note briefly discusses the observation of elapsed time in a flat universe while exploring the argument of past-eternal time versus emergent time in cosmology. A flat universe with an incomplete past forever has a finite age. Despite an infinite number of Planck time coordinates independent of phenomena and endless expansion, a flat universe never develops an age with an infinite number of Planck times. This observation indicates the impossibility of infinitely elapsed time in the future or past, which limits (...) acceptable scientific models of cosmology. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to study the extent in which the semantics for different logical systems can be represented game theoretically. I will begin by considering different definitions of what it means to gamify a semantics, and show completeness and limitative results. In particular, I will argue that under a proper definition of gamification, all finitely algebraizable logics can be gamified, as well as some infinitely algebraizable ones (like Łukasiewicz) and some non-algebraizable (like intuitionistic and van Fraassen supervaluation (...) logic). (shrink)

I examine John Polkinghorne's account of how God acts in the world, focusing on how his ideas developed with the consideration of the notion of kenosis, and how this development was not a rejection of his previous ideas, but on the contrary a fulfilling of his own personal philosophical and theological insights. Polkinghorne's thought can be distinguished in three different periods:1) divine action as input of active information (1988-2000/2001);2) Polkinghorne's reception of the notion of kenosis (2000-2004);3) Polkinghorne's "thought experiment" approach (...) to his ideas on divine action (2004- ). Finally, I consider the question of internal coherence of this theological development, focusing on the transition from the first to the second period, which I believe to be the most significant. (shrink)

This paper briefly proposes a weak relative identity strategy for the doctrine of the Trinity called the general partnership model. This model develops a logically consistent metaphysical constitution for the orthodox Christian doctrines of one divine substance and three divine persons. Moreover, the model rejects the rigid use of absolute identity in Trinitarian doctrine while modeling relative identity with an analogy of general partnerships in the United States.

In this paper I offer a distinction between design and teleology, referring mostly to thehistory of these two terms, in order to suggest an alternative strategy for arguments thatintend to demonstrate the existence of the divine. I do not deal with the soundness ofeither design or teleological arguments. I rather emphasise the differences between thesetwo terms, and how these differences involve radically different arguments for the existence of the divine. I argue that the term „design‟ refers to an extrinsic feature (...) that was in history understood to be imposed by God in nature, while one may argue for an internal tendency, what I call „teleology‟. I first offer a historical tour of design arguments and how the basic notion of design was understood in extrinsic terms. I then briefly present three kinds of objections available in history to these arguments: philosophical, scientific, and theological. I finally move to discussing an intrinsicunderstanding of teleology, and how this notion differs from that of extrinsic design. Iend the paper showing how this notion could be useful in interpreting processes innature, in particular the reproductive tendencies in living beings. (shrink)

In this paper, I present and analyse the theological reasons given by contemporary authors such as Robert J. Russell, Thomas Tracy and John Polkinghorne, as well as thirteenth‑century scholar Thomas Aquinas, to admit that the created universe requires being intrinsically contingent in its causing, in particular referring to their doctrines of providence. Contemporary authors stress the need of having indeterminate events within the natural world to allow for God’s providential action within creation, whereas Aquinas focuses his argument on the idea (...) that a universe which includes contingent causes is a more perfect universe. I compare these two approaches, concluding that Aquinas’ seems to be better suited to account for true indetermination within the natural world, claiming that divine causality is not required to complement natural causality in its own level. (shrink)

Joseph Hannon has expressed a most surprising objection to Aquinas scholar Prof William E. Carroll in his latest paper “Theological Objections to a Metaphysicalist Interpretation of Creation.” The main claim is that Prof. Carroll misunderstands Aquinas' doctrine of creatio ex nihilo by reducing it to a metaphysical notion, rather than considering it in its full theological sense. In this paper I show Hannon's misinterpretation of Carroll's and Thomas Aquinas' thought, particularly by stressing the dependence that the doctrine of providence through (...) secondary causes has on the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. (shrink)

Current disputes over the nature and purpose of the university are rooted in a philosophical divide between theory and practice. Academics often defend the concept of a university devoted to purely theoretical activities. Politicians and wider society tend to argue that the university should take on more practical concerns. I critique two typical defenses of the theoretical concept—one historical and one based on the value of pure research—and show that neither the theoretical nor the practical concept of a university accommodates (...) all the important goals expected of university research and teaching. Using the classical pragmatist argument against a sharp division between theory and practice, I show how we can move beyond the debate between the theoretical and practical concepts of a university, while maintaining a place for pure and applied research, liberal and vocational education, and social impact through both economic applications and criticism aimed at promoting social justice. (shrink)

Este artículo considera el problema de justicia en la investigación biomédica en países en desarrollo. En particular se hace foco en la discusión de si el requisito de poner a disposición toda intervención probada efectiva puede ser considerado como una obligación post investigación de los patrocinadores hacia la comunidad anfitriona. Primero, se discuten las concepciones de la Comisión Nacional de Asesoramiento sobre Bioética (NBAC) de los Estados Unidos y de las guías éticas internacionales sobre la obligación post investigación hacia la (...) comunidad. Luego, se examinan las interpretaciones del modelo de disponibilidad razonable y el modelo de beneficios justos sobre la condición de acceso a los beneficios post investigación. Por último, presento y critico el argumento del carácter contraproducente de la obligación post investigación que afirma que la obligación post investigación limita el desarrollo de la investigación y empeora la situación de las poblaciones de los países en desarrollo. [ABSTRACT] This article refers to the problem of justice in biomedical research in developing countries and in particular it focus in the discussion of whether the requirement of making available any effective intervention could be consider a post-trial obligation of the sponsor towards the host community. First, the National Advisory Bioethics Commission’s (NBAC) conception and the international guidelines’ conception of post-trial obligations towards the community are discussed. Second, the interpretation of reasonable availability model and the fair benefits model of the condition of access to post trial benefits are examined. Finally, I present and criticize the moral counterproductive argument which affirms that post trial obligations towards the community prevent new drug research and make population in developing countries worse off. (shrink)

En este ensayo propongo una lectura de los contornos de la primera Meditación. Con ella intento resaltar una dimensión importante del pensamiento de Descartes en torno a la virtud de la precisión. Contrasto la preocupación por la verdad en la vida cotidiana y en la indagación cartesiana, exploro la manera en que Descartes enfrenta algunos riesgos epistémicos en el curso de su meditación, señalo algunos aspectos de su concepción de la agencia epistémica y concluyo con una breve disquisición alrededor de (...) la apuesta de Pascal. (shrink)

En este ensayo planteo una dificultad que encuentro en la última propuesta de Quine sobre las oraciones observacionales. Argumento que esta dificultad impide que tales oraciones cumplan el rol que él les asigna en su filosofía y socavan su empirismo ilustrado. Luego exploro tentativamente un resquicio que encuentro en la propia filosofía quineana que eventualmente podría evitar los problemas derivados de dicha dificultad. El precio de seguir el camino apuntado por ese resquicio es, sin embargo, una cierta reinterpretación del espíritu (...) empirista de la filosofía de Quine. (shrink)

¿Qué ocurre con la continuidad del tratamiento de los sujetos de investigación después de que realizan la última visita del ensayo en el que participan? En algunos casos, la falta de continuidad de atención de la salud apropiada podría poner en peligro la salud de estas personas. Por lo tanto, es probable que los sujetos de investigación que al terminar su participación en un ensayo todavía se encuentran enfermos, necesiten continuar con el tratamiento en estudio u otra atención de la (...) salud adecuada por el resto de sus vidas, sean unos pocos meses o muchos años. No obstante, no todas las sociedades cuentan con los recursos e instituciones para resolver el problema de la continuidad de tratamiento beneficioso. La opinión de un sujeto de investigación norteamericano, al que llamaremos Pedro, sin seguro de salud que participó en un ensayo de largo plazo sobre diabetes ejemplifica el problema de la continuidad de tratamiento beneficioso: “de repente [ellos] simplemente cortan la cuerda, y uno está solo por su cuenta, ya sabes. O consigues trescientos o cuatrocientos dólares al mes para seguir con esto o simplemente sigues adelante y mueres”. En este trabajo intentaré dar un panorama de la reciente discusión en torno al problema de la continuidad de tratamiento beneficioso en la ética de la investigación. Por tratamiento beneficioso hago referencia a dos cosas. En primer lugar, el tratamiento beneficioso puede ser (1) el tratamiento en estudio, p. e. el tratamiento o intervención en investigación que estaba recibiendo Pedro para su diabetes en el ejemplo anterior. Una droga o un producto biológico es un tratamiento en estudio para un uso propuesto (indicación) desde el primer ensayo con seres humanos hasta el momento en que es aprobado para su comercialización por las autoridades reguladoras de fármacos. El segundo lugar, el tratamiento beneficioso también puede ser (2) otra atención de la salud apropiada para el sujeto de investigación distinta del tratamiento en estudio, p. e. si existiera un tratamiento alternativo disponible para la enfermedad o condición de Pedro, distinto del tratamiento en estudio, y se justificara hacer la transición a ese otro tratamiento por razones de un mejor perfil de efectividad, seguridad y/o toxicidad. En la sección 1 de este trabajo introduciré una taxonomía de las obligaciones éticas de acceso posinvestigación (1.1.), realizaré un relevamiento histórico del concepto basado en las guías éticas internacionales (1.2) y analizaré el surgimiento del término “continuidad de tratamiento beneficioso hacia los sujetos de investigación” y otros términos análogos como “atención después de la investigación” (1.3). En la sección 2 presentaré los casos ejemplares en la bibliografía: continuidad de tratamiento en investigación en VIH/SIDA (2.1), continuidad de tratamiento en investigación en cáncer (2.2.) y otros casos de continuidad de tratamiento (2.3). (shrink)

En este ensayo intento mostrar el estrecho vínculo entre el asunto de la fijación de la extensión de los términos de clase natural y el problema de la proyectabilidad puesto de relieve por Goodman con su nuevo enigma de la inducción. Por un lado argumento que el nuevo enigma de la inducción pone de manifiesto la presencia de un elemento fregeano en la teoría de la referencia directa de Putnam y, por el otro, señalo la necesidad de que una respuesta (...) realista a dicho enigma se articule con una tesis epistemológica de cómo conocemos las presuntas propiedades intrínsecas de los objetos. (shrink)